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THE VIRTUES OF PRAGMATISM IN
DRUG POLICY
RICHARD J. BONNIE*
INTRODUCTION
As part of the University of Maryland School of Law's Law & Health Care
Program's conference on Obstacles to the Development and Use of
Pharmacotherapies for Addiction, this Article focuses on the challenges of the
increasing use of medical agents if they are developed.' Expanding the potential
market for these drugs will increase the likelihood that they will be developed in the
first place.2 My point of departure is that the best way of responding to this
challenge is to put the nation's drug policy on the right track.3 I say this because a
sensible drug policy will encourage, and indeed subsidize, the use of evidence-
based, cost-effective addiction treatments.4
The basic thrust of my argument is that we need a stable, and essentially
pragmatic, drug policy that avoids the ideologically driven positions that have for
so long dominated policy discourse and, because such positions are so contentious,
have tended to paralyze policy-making. 5 Just to provide a point of reference, the
only time such a policy was actually in place was about thirty years ago during the
Nixon and Ford administrations, extending into the early years of the Carter
administration.
As background, the statement I just made is admittedly somewhat self-
serving. I was Associate Director of the National Commission on Marijuana and
Drug Use (the Commission) from 1971 to 1973 and was a principal architect of
the Commission's two reports, the first of which recommended the
Copyright © 2010 by Richard J. Bonnie.
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1. See infra Part Ill.
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decriminalization of marijuana use in 1972.6 The final report, issued the following
year, recommended a framework for drug policy that remains pertinent today.
7
During the several years that followed, I served as an advisor to the Directors of
what was then called the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention
(SAODAP) (1973-77), was appointed to the position of Secretary of the first
National Advisory Council on Drug Abuse (1975-80), contributed to the first of
several Federal Strategies on Drug Abuse and helped write an important White Paper
on Drug Abuse for the Ford Administration (1976). During this short period, I
8think our nation's drug policy was moving in the right direction. As this Article
will discuss, however, the pendulum suddenly swung in the other direction and
remained there for more than twenty years.
9
This Article will give a brief historical account of drug policy and then draw
out three implications of my views that bear most heavily on the subject of this
conference.
I. A PRAGMATIC VIEW OF DRUG POLICY
Our nation's policy toward opiates and cocaine-and later marijuana and
other so-called drugs of abuse-had its roots in the Progressive Era of the early
twentieth century.'0 The Pure Food and Drugs Act' I was enacted in 1906, and the
6. NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING 150-51 (1972) ("The Commission is of the unanimous opinion that marihuana use
is not such a grave problem that individuals who smoke marihuana, and possess it for that purpose,
should be subject to criminal procedures .... In general, we recommend . . . a decriminalization of
possession of marihuana for personal use on both the state and federal levels."). Except in citations, this
Article spells the drug name as marijuana rather than marihuana or its alternate spellings.
7. NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN
PERSPECTIVE 408-12 (1973) (recommending a framework of decriminalization and focus on individual
responsibility).
8. See generally DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Steven R.
Belenko ed., 2000) [hereinafter DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA] (reviewing the U.S. drug
policies, starting from the mid-nineteenth century); DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE:
ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973) (providing an historical perspective of the origins of the
American drug policy); DAVID F. MUSTO & PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL:
POLITICS AND FEDERAL POLICY IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING SUBSTANCE ABUSE, 1963-1981 (2002)
(contrasting the drug policies of the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See MUSTO, supra note 8, at 23 ("[Alt the beginning of 1908, . . . federal action was
contemplated as a token of American concern about the international narcotic traffic .... The State
Department... came into prominence as a leading proponent of narcotic legislation both nationally and
internationally.").
11. Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 301-399 (2006)). The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 sought to prevent the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of adulterated, misbranded, poisonous, or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and liquors,
id., aiding in accomplishing the goal of controlling narcotic drugs.
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Harrison Narcotic Act' 2 was enacted in 1914. The premise of these statutes was that
controlling narcotic drugs and making them available only for medical purposes
would eradicate addiction and the problems that are associated with addiction, as
well as the disordered behavior that can be associated with acute intoxication. 3 In
the 1920s, the federal government took the position that maintenance treatment of
addiction was not a legitimate medical use.14 Although the main components of this
strategy were criminalization and enforcement, 5 the federal government set up two
hospitals for the treatment of addiction in 1929.16
The heavy reliance on criminal enforcement, even for users, intensified after
World War II in response to an epidemic of heroin use in New York City and other
major cities. 17 Congress and state legislatures responded by escalating penalties and
12. Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785, repealed by Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971). The Harrison Narcotic Act was another attempt to control narcotic
drugs, requiring all persons who interacted at all with opium or coca leaves to register with and pay a tax
to the collectors of internal revenue. Id.
13. See 146 CONG. REC. S7193, S7203 (daily ed. July 19, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(discussing the importance of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, among others, as "ensur[ing] that drug
products [are] carefully controlled" to prevent inappropriate use of drugs other than for safe and
effective purposes); 133 CONG. REC. S384 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) (statement of Sen. Inouye)
(recounting the historical development of heroin prohibition in the United States, noting that the
Harrison Narcotics Act "banned the recreational use of heroin... to stem the growing number of opium
addicts," but that the statute "left the door open for the prescription of heroin by doctors...").
14. See Joseph F. Spillane, Building a Drug Control Regime, 1919-1930, in FEDERAL DRUG
CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE 26, 38-39 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane
eds., 2004) (discussing a series of cases in the 1920s that supported a "strict antimaintenance policy").
15. See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION: A
HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 18-21 (1974) (describing the Harrison
Act as a "prohibition statute" designed for "enforce[ment] against maintenance and street use," and
concluding that the removal of "any legitimate source of narcotic drugs" from the medical profession
resulted in criminalization of "the user's entire lifestyle").
16. Porter Narcotic Farm Act, Pub. L. No. 70-672, 45 Stat. 1085, 1085 (1929) ("An Act [t]o
establish two ... narcotic farms for the confinement and treatment of persons addicted to the use of
habit-forming narcotic drugs who have been convicted of offenses against the United States."). See
MUSTO, supra note 8, at 184, 206. Musto attributes the development of the two federal hospitals for the
treatment of addiction to a "superabundance of narcotics prisoners" that resulted under enforcement of
the Harrison Narcotic Act, describing the hospitals established in Fort Worth, Texas, and Lexington,
Kentucky as narcotic farms. Id. at 184.
17. David T. Courtwright, The Roads to H." The Emergence of the American Heroin Complex,
1898-1956, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN 3, 13 (David F. Musto ed., 2002); Joseph F. Spillane,
Federal Policy in the Post-Anslinger Era: A Guide to Sources, 1962-2001, in FEDERAL DRUG
CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE 209, 211 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane
eds., 2004). For specific statutes enacted after World War 1I, see, e.g., Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No.
82-255, 65 Stat. 767, 767 (enacting significant penalties for violation of federal narcotic laws); 1955
Ohio Laws 178, 189-90 (establishing a range of penalties, including a fine of S10,000 and imprisonment
of two years to life for violation of certain Ohio narcotics provisions); 1952 Va. Acts 736, 738-39
(imposing a variety of penalties for violations of Virginia narcotics laws).
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making them mandatory.' 8 This repressive response in the 1950s triggered a
significant drug policy reform movement for the first time. 19 This movement grew
in strength and spanned the 1960s, drawing together several different, though
overlapping, policy perspectives. 2° The following sections describe three such
perspectives that I will call medical,21 non-criminal,22 and libertarian23 approaches.
A. The Medical Approach
Under a medicalization perspective, addiction should be treated rather than
punished. This position has roots going back to addiction maintenance clinics that
were shut down in the 1920s.24 In the 1960s, the therapeutic position toward
addiction was also linked to a broader faith in a rehabilitative ideal-a therapeutic
alternative to incarceration and punishment for the disease of crime.25 This
perspective had a distinct ideological flavor since its adherents embraced a more
deterministic view of the roots of criminal behavior and a correspondingly
18. See Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, 70 Stat. 567, 568 (imposing a penalty of
two to ten years in prison and a fine of up to $20,000 for violation of federal statutes relating to narcotic
drugs and marijuana, even where no specific penalty is provided for the violation); DRUGS AND DRUG
POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 195 (noting that the Boggs Act established mandatory minimum
sentences for drug trafficking laws for the first time); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT &
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 223 (1967) ("In 1951, following the
post-World War 1I upsurge in reported addiction, mandatory minimum sentences were introduced for all
narcotic and marihuana offenses .... "). Compare Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50
Stat. 551, 551-52 (levying a tax on, rather that criminalizing, commercial dealings in marijuana), with
Boggs Act of 1951, 65 Stat. at 767 (imposing criminal penalties for import and export laws related to
drugs as well as establishing mandatory minimum prison sentences for possession of marijuana, cocaine,
and opiates).
19. See DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 209 (describing the end of the
1950s as the beginning of a shift in "the focus of American drug policy over the next 20 years ... to a
greater tolerance for drug use, and a greater distinction between the drug seller and drug user"); JAMES
C. WEISSMAN, DRUG ABUSE: THE LAW AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES 121 (1978) (attributing the
shift in drug control policies to a 1961 "joint American Bar Association-American Medical Association
report on drug addiction... [that] criticized the popular law enforcement approach to addiction control
and recommended a more balanced prevention policy").
20. WEISSMAN, supra note 19, at 121.
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.B.
23. See infra Part I.C.
24. See, e.g., EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 73 (1996)
(describing efforts in the early 1920s to close the numerous clinics that "had emerged ... [as] an
alternative to criminalization and incarceration").
25. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND
SOCIAL PURPOSE 2 (1981) ("[T]he rehabilitative ideal is the notion that a primary purpose of penal
treatment is to effect changes in the character, attitudes, and behavior of convicted offenders, so as to
strengthen the social defense against unwanted behavior, but also to contribute to the welfare and
satisfactions of offenders."); David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REV. 289, 291, 296
(1972) (noting that the United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962),
"opened the therapeutic door" for treatment of drug users).
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narrowed view of when offenders should be held responsible for offending conduct
that was so obviously attributable to psychopathology, or to poverty and a "rotten
social background., 26 This view was most famously associated with Judge David
Bazelon on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.27 It was also
reflected in statutes requiring treatment of sexual psychopaths, 28 in Maryland's
Defective Delinquent statute, 29 and in the innovative civil commitment statutes for
narcotics addicts adopted in California in 196 130 and by Congress in 1966.
3 1
B. The Non-Criminal Approach
The decriminalization position overlaps with medicalization but, as described
in this Article, it is more pragmatic and less ideological. Proponents of
decriminalization argued that the criminal legal framework was overextended and
should be contracted.32 This argument did not raise moral doubts about holding
offenders responsible for their transgressions or imply that the underlying causes of
criminal behavior are beyond their control; it focused instead on the costs of using
26. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting)
("If we could remove the practical impediments to the free flow of information we might begin to learn
something about the causes of crime. We might discover, for example, that there is a significant causal
relationship between violent criminal behavior and a 'rotten social background."').
27. See David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385, 401-03
(1976) ("The overwhelming majority of violent street crime ... is committed by people at the bottom of
the socioeconomic-cultural ladder .... I must conclude that those people turn to crime for reasons such
as economic survival, a sense of excitement or accomplishment, and an outlet for frustration,
desperation, and rage. . . . [T]he only apparent solution to the poverty-causes-crime problem is to
alleviate the suffering of all deprived people .... ); cf Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare
Criminology: A Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1247, 1249-50 (1976) (advocating a
contrary view to Judge Bazelon's analysis of criminal responsibility and social welfare solutions).
28. See, e.g., Edwin H. Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM. J. Soc. 142,
142-48 (1950) (discussing the increase in enactment of sexual psychopath laws that order indefinite
confinement for those diagnosed as sexual psychopaths, not as punishment for a crime, but for societal
protection); Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCl. 215, 215 (1960) (noting sexual psychopath laws are grounded in the
notion that a sexual psychopath requires special consideration and that the laws are aimed at protecting
society and rehabilitating the offender).
29. Defective Delinquents Act, ch. 476, 1951 Md. Laws 1343 (repealed 1999); see also Tippett v.
State of Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1155-57 (4th Cir. 1971) (summarizing the Defective Delinquents Act
as "set[ting] up a comprehensive scheme of referral, examination, commitment, treatment and release of
persons suspected of being defective delinquents" and "represent[ing] an enlightened and progressive
experiment aimed at rehabilitating persons whose anti-social activities are occasioned, at least in part, by
mental disorders").
30. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 3050-3051 (West 1998). The California statute stipulates that, if
the judge believes a convicted defendant "may be addicted or ... in imminent danger of becoming
addicted to narcotics," the "judge shall ... order the district attorney to file a petition for a commitment
•.. in the narcotic detention, treatment and rehabilitation facility" of the Department of Corrections. Id.
31. Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-793, § 101, 80 Stat. 1438, 1438-40
(repealed 2000).
32. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 15, at 270-71.
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the criminal justice system to repress certain behavior. 33 A main case in point was
illegal drug use, and the primary historical antecedent for the decriminalization
argument was alcohol prohibition.34 The Wickersham Commission in 1930 amply
documented the costs of prohibition, including lawlessness, corruption and
disrespect for law, which led to repeal of the National Prohibition Act.
35
This general perspective of decriminalization was widely accepted among law
professors and was epitomized in a 1968 article by Professor Sanford Kadish
entitled The Crisis of Overcriminalization.36 It was also prominently reflected in the
task force reports on narcotics and drunkenness prepared for the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice and in the
Commission's Report. 37 The true hallmarks of the decriminalization approach were
outright repeal of criminal sanctions (as for consensual sex offenses and gambling)
and diversion from the criminal process of offenders for whom drug abuse
education, social services, or therapeutic responses were appropriate.
38
Doubts about the use of criminal justice to control drug use became even
greater in the face of the fundamental change in the social epidemiology of
marijuana use and use of other drugs in the 1960s. 39 This overall perspective-a
33. Id. at 271-72.
34. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Solving the Drug Enforcement Dilemma: Lessons from Economics, 1994
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 209.
35. See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 71-722, pt. III, at 44-60 (3d Sess.
1931) (describing the negative aspects of the enforcement of the prohibition laws).
36. Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 17, 24-26 (1968)
(addressing the problems associated with prohibition, namely the creation of large-scale, black market-
type organization to produce and distribute illegal product and to police corruption).
37. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 133-34, 229 (1967) (endorsing
decriminalization of public drunkenness and diversion of people with alcohol, drug, and mental health
problems from the criminal justice system). The Commission's Task Force Report on Narcotics and
Drug Abuse included consultants' papers recommending a shift of emphasis toward treatment rather
than punishment, and decriminalization of possession of marijuana. Richard H. Blum, Mind-Altering
Drugs & Dangerous Behavior: Narcotics, in TASK FORCE ON NARCOTICS & DRUG ABUSE, PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: NARCOTICS AND DRUG
ABUSE: ANNOTATIONS AND CONSULTANTS' PAPERS 40, 58-59 (1967); Michael P. Rosenthal, Proposals
for Dangerous Drug Legislation, in TASK FORCE ON NARCOTICS & DRUG ABUSE, supra, at 80, 126; see
also NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS & GOALS, A NATIONAL STRATEGY
TO REDUCE CRIME 131-37 (1973) (discussing the Commission's recommendations on reducing the
scope of the criminal law, including decriminalizing drunkenness and reevaluating penalties for
possession of marijuana, prostitution, pronogrphy, and gambling).
38. WEISSMAN, supra note 19, at 121; Aaron Craig, Gambling on the Internet, 1998 COMP. L. REV.
& TECH. J. 61, 65; Diana Hassel, The Use of Criminal Sodomy Laws in Civil Litigation, 79 TEX. L. REv.
813, 819-20 (2001).
39. See NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 114-16 ("[A]s one
proceeds through the criminal justice system, from district attorneys to court clinicians, the people
responsible for the functioning of that system seem to be decreasingly enthusiastic about the
appropriateness of criminal control and decreasingly insistent on any technique for formal control.");
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cost-benefit, pragmatic analysis-was clearly reflected in the 1972 and 1973
reports of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse40 and the
simultaneous reforms of national and state drug policy that were adopted during the
1970s.41
First, the Controlled Substances Act4 2 consolidated a patchwork of drug laws
and set up an integrated regulatory framework for classifying and scheduling
psychoactive drugs based on a balance between their medical utility and their risk
of abuse.43 An important policy feature of the Controlled Substances Act was that it
radically reduced penalties for drug offenses that had escalated during the 1950s,
reducing simple possession to a misdemeanor, grading penalties for commercial
offenses, and eliminating mandatory penalties. 44
Secondly, in the wake of the Commission reports, ten states decriminalized
possession of small amounts of marijuana and other consumption-related
offenses. 45 Decriminalization was widely supported by a broad range of
William B. McAllister, Habitual Problems: The United States and International Drug Control, in
FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 14, at 175, 195, 200
(noting the link between the growth of drug demand in the 1960s and the myriad prevention approaches
as "alternatives to the dominant control and enforcement paradigm").
40. See Marihuana Research and Legal Controls, 1974: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Alcoholism and Narcotics of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong. 134, 135 (1974)
(statement of Richard J. Bonnie, Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School,
Charlottesville, Va.) (testifying about the 1972 Commission Report); Marijuana Decriminalization:
Hearing on S. 1450 Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 109, 111 (1975) (statement of Richard Bonnie, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.) (testifying about the Commission's recommendation to
discourage marijuana use without criminalization); NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE,
supra note 7, at 210-11 (analyzing drug control efforts from a social cost and efficacy perspective).
41. DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 288, 293 ("By the early 1970s, a major
policy shift had occurred as a result of the debate over marijuana use .... By 1972, [forty-two] of the
states and the District of Columbia had ... classified marijuana possession as a misdemeanor.");
Richard J. Bonnie, The Meaning of "Decriminalization ": A Review of the Law, 8 CONTEMP. DRUG
PROBS. 277, 278, 283 (1981), reprinted in DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 345-
46.
42. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, §§ 101-709, 84
Stat. 1236, 1242-84 (1970). The Controlled Substances Act is the short title for Title I of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. Id. § 101, 84 Stat. at 1242.
43. See Kenneth C. Baumgartner & Michael X. Morrell, Pharmaceutical Industry Regulation by
the Department of Justice, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 785, 793-94 (1972) (summarizing the five schedule
classifications that comprise the regulatory framework established under the Controlled Substances Act).
44. Compare BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 15, at 204-07 (discussing the endemic of drug
use emerging from the 1940s into the 1950s and the repressive legal response), with Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act §§ 401-404 (showing the reduction of simple possession to a
misdemeanor, grading penalties for commercial offenses, and showing permissive latitude in sentencing
guidelines, eliminating mandatory penalties).
45. RICHARD J. BONNIE, MARIJUANA USE AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF DECRIMINALIZATION 41 (1980); Richard J. Bonnie, Decriminalizing the Marijuana
User: A Drafter's Guide, I 1 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 3, 3 (1977).
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constituencies,46 not on libertarian grounds, but rather on the pragmatic ground that
the costs of criminalization outweigh its benefits.47 The theory was that the nation's
compelling goal of deterring and discouraging drug use, especially by young
people, could be achieved through many other tools of social control without
arresting hundreds of thousands of people and putting them in jail.48
Thirdly, the Commission recommended-and it became federal policy during
this period-that the nation make a concerted effort to provide treatment for people
with addictions, and specifically to deploy the criminal justice system as an
instrument of therapeutic leverage, rather than punishment, for addicted
offenders.49 Community treatment agencies were set up throughout the country to
provide services to offenders diverted from the criminal justice system.50 For
example, a program called Treatment Alternative to Street Crime was created under
the Office of the White House to implement this leveraged approach,5 1 and a
Uniform Drug Dependence Treatment and Rehabilitation Act was drafted to serve
as a model for state law.52 Among the first programs to make widespread use of
methadone maintenance was one established in the District of Columbia in 1971,
with the strong support of President Nixon.53 It was not based on any moral
commitment to rehabilitative justice, but rather on a hard-headed determination that
treating addicted offenders would reduce crime.54 In short, the strategy was
thought, based on evidence of effectiveness, to achieve measurable social
benefits.
46. BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 15, at 270-78.
47. Id. at 271.
48. See, e.g., TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 20-23 (1969) (suggesting different
theories of social control including commitment to social standing, involvement in communal activities,
and designing a personal belief system).
49. NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, supra note 7, at 337-42, 405.
50. William L. White, Trick or Treat? A Century of American Responses to Heroin Addiction, in
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN, supra note 17, at 131, 131, 138-40.
51. EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR: OPIATES AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 226
(1977).
52. WEISSMAN, supra note 19, at 142-43. The Act was subsequently withdrawn due to lack of
adoptions. Id. at 143; Lawrence 0. Gostin, Compulsory Treatment for Drug-Dependent Persons:
Justifications for a Public Health Approach to Drug Dependency, 69 MILBANK Q. 561, 567 (1991)
(stating that the Uniform Act was not well received by the states and that not one had adopted it in
whole or in part).
53. DAN BAUM, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF FAILURE 30-31
(1996) (indicating that the Narcotics Treatment Administration (NTA) received $7.5 million in 1970,
opening twenty methadone treatment centers in the District of Columbia); Robert L. DuPont, Heroin
Addiction Treatment and Crime Reduction, 128 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 856, 857 (1972) (noting that, by the
spring of 1971, the NTA had about 2700 heroin addicts in treatment in the District of Columbia and that
low-dose methadone treatment was used).
54. DuPont, supra note 53, at 857, 859.
55. Id. at 859; see also MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 8, at 81-82. Studies of these programs
showed a lower rate of self-reported crime and arrest during and after methadone treatment than before,
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Using the criminal justice system for therapeutic leverage was a component of
a broader investment in prevention and treatment-in "demand reduction," as it
came to be called. Perhaps the most important federal legislative initiative during
this period was the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972.56 This path-
breaking law not only set up SAODAP within the White House for the specific
purpose of focusing on prevention and treatment,57 but also enveloped substance
abuse treatment in a nearly airtight cloak of confidentiality as a means of assuring
that the patients' health information would be protected, and thereby drew people
into treatment voluntarily rather than having to push them into treatment through
coercion.
58
C. The Libertarian Approach
A third intellectual thread of the discourse of drug policy reform during the
1960s was the libertarian approach. According to this perspective, people have a
right to control their bodies and minds and a "right to be different," 59 and these
rights encompass a right to use drugs for "self-defined" purposes, including
intoxication.6 ° Obviously, this position is explicitly ideological, not pragmatic, and,
quite frankly, it has never had any traction in the policy arena. Indeed, libertarian
rhetoric has mainly served to contaminate the more pragmatic arguments of reform
by giving defenders of the current policy an easy target, and enabling them to tar
the more pragmatic position with the same brush that they criticize the libertarian
position.
or as compared to program drop-outs. See, e.g., DuPont, supra note 53, at 859 (reporting an association
between heroin treatment and a reduction in serious crime in Washington, D.C. in 1970); Robert L.
DuPont & Richard N. Katon, Development of a Heroin-Addicted Treatment Program: Effect on Urban
Crime, 216 JAMA 1320, 1323 (1971) (reporting that narcotic treatment programs "have benefited the
heroin-addict patient and his family in many ways as shown by increased employment, decreased
arrests, and decreased use of illicit drugs").
56. Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, 86 Stat. 65 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1181).
57. Id. § 201, 86 Stat. at 67; see also DRUGS AND DRUG POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 8, at 250
(describing the establishment of the SAODAP as the first time that "a president gave priority to
prevention and treatment efforts").
58. Jerome H. Jaffe, One Bite of the Apple: Establishing the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse
Prevention, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN, supra note 17, at 43, 51.
59. See generally NICHOLAS N. KITrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED
THERAPY (1971). In order to protect "fundamental rights and liberties of individuals" there must be a
Therapeutic Bill of Rights that reflects "differing patients, goals, and methods of treatment ...." Id. at
402. The Therapeutic Bill of Rights reflects "Man's innate right to remain free of excessive forms of
human modification" and his ability to act upon his "fundamental rights and liberties." Id.
60. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 15, at 118 (noting that early drug policy likely failed
to address "the use of drugs for pleasure or other self-defined purposes"); JACOB SULLUM, SAYING YES:
IN DEFENSE OF DRUG USE (2003) (discussing various arguments for and against drug use, including "the
desire to alter one's consciousness"). See generally DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 44-51
(1992) (discussing the rights associated with recreational use of drugs).
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II. THE REGRESSIVE PERIOD
It has been widely recognized that the reform period was short-lived. Indeed,
it came to an end during the late 1970s and was followed by a repressive "war on
drugs" for two decades. 61 The war on drugs was predicated on a belief that
unyielding reliance on criminal punishment and other sanctions and social
disapproval ("zero tolerance") was necessary to suppress drug use.62 Under this
view, any policy or social practice that tolerates drug use is thought to encourage it,
and strong punishments by the criminal law are regarded as absolutely essential. It
is self-evident that this moralistic perspective rejects all of the reform perspectives
described above.63 The war-on-drugs approach eschews not only a rights-oriented
libertarian view, but also rejects the self-restraint in the use of criminal sanctions
and incarceration that is a cardinal feature of the decriminalization perspective.
Finally, it also rejects the medical approach to the extent that allowing treatment in
lieu of punishment could weaken the message of zero tolerance. 64
After twenty years, the pendulum is finally swinging away from the
uncompromising ideologically-driven premise of the war on drugs and zero
tolerance. The costs of the war in lives as well as treasure have been very high, and
the benefits are at best difficult to assess.65 In 2001, the National Research Council,
an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, issued an important report on drug
policy.66 The study committee, on which I served, had been directed to assess the
adequacy of the data and research for making informed drug policy.67 The
committee pointed out that the evidence base for policy-making was relatively
strong on the demand side because the pertinent National Institutes of Health and
other federal agencies, especially the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA), had invested a great deal of funding to assess the
efficacy and effectiveness of prevention interventions and treatments for
addiction.68 In contrast, the committee pointed out that virtually no evidence exists
61. For a discussion of the "war on drugs", see BAUM, supra note 53, at vii; ARTHUR BENAVIE,
DRUGS: AMERICA'S HOLY WAR (2009); GARY L. FISHER, RETHINKING OUR WAR ON DRUGS: CANDID
TALK ABOUT CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES 1-5 (2006); MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG
POLICY FOR RESULTS 135-50 (1992); MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIx 186 (1998).
62. Duane C. McBride et al., Alternative Perspectives on the Drug Policy Debate, in THE DRUG
LEGALIZATION DEBATE 9,9, 15 (James A. Inciardi ed., 2d ed. 1999).
63. See supra Part I.
64. Eric Blumenson, Recovering From Drugs and the Drug War: An Achievable Public Health
Alternative, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 225, 231 (2002).
65. FISHER, supra note 61, at 6-8; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INFORMING AMERICA'S POLICY ON
ILLEGAL DRUGS: WHAT WE DON'T KNOW KEEPS HURTING US 1-3 (Charles F. Manski et al. eds.,
2001); Rufus King, A Worthless Crusade, in THE CRISIS IN DRUG PROHIBITION 122, 123 (David Boaz
ed., 1990).
66. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 65.
67. Id. at 1-2.
68. Id. at 273-74.
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with respect to the effectiveness of measures being taken on the supply side, not
only regarding the effects of enforcement on price and availability but also
regarding the effects of locking up hundreds of thousands of people who sell or use
drugs.69 There was, and is, very little research and very little evidence of
effectiveness of the drug policies on which billions of dollars are spent every
70year.
The committee was charged only with assessing the science base for making
drug policy, not with making policy recommendations. 71 However, the committee
did ask, rhetorically, how the government could have implemented a policy of this
scope, expending tens of billions of scarce public dollars every year (with major
collateral effects on peoples' lives) without making any effort to assess its
72effectiveness. We characterized the government's indifference to this lack of
evidence as "unconscionable," as indeed it is.
7 3
It is long since time to return to the more pragmatic, evidence-based
perspective that was ascendant for about a decade in the late 1960s and 1970s. How
should we go about resurrecting and implementing this approach today?
III. SOME IMPLICATIONS
The argument in this Article entails many changes in drug policy, including a
much more hard-headed look at the gains and costs of alternative enforcement
strategies. However, this Article will concentrate on three basic implications
regarding the treatment of addiction.74
The first implication has to do with vocabulary, which is extremely important
in policy discourse. Consider, for example, the significance of recent discussions
about whether the nation is undertaking a "bailout" of the financial system or a
"rescue plan" for the American economy. 75 Vocabulary has proven to be especially
69. Id. at 274-75.
70. Id. at 272, 274-75 (discussing the lack of evidence on the effectiveness of drug policies during
both the early 1970s and the late 1990s).
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id. at 274, 279.
73. Id. at 11, 279.
74. See infra Parts III.A-C. For a more elaborate presentation of the issues described in this section,
see generally Richard J. Bonnie, Responsibility for Addiction, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 405,
405-13 (2002).
75. See, e.g., Knight Kiplinger, Editorial, Don't Call It a Bailout, KIPLINGER.COM, Oct. 1, 2008,
http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/2008/10/governmentplan not a bailout.html?kipadid=l?
kipad_id=l. The editorial implored society to use certain vocabulary when discussing the government's
efforts to address the recent ailing economy:
It's time to banish the word "bailout" from our financial journalism vocabulary. The press's
overuse and misuse of this pejorative, misleading word accounts for part of Washington's
difficulty in crafting a plan to stabilize credit markets .... Call it a lifeline, a stabilization
plan, a buyout-anything but a bailout. It's no sweet deal for Wall Street. But it is indeed a
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important in the context of drug policy because progressive positions seem always
to be successfully characterized as being more radical than they are.76 For example,
the Commission purposely selected the term "decriminalization" as a way of
clearly distinguishing the policy it was recommending from "legalization." 77 The
Commission specifically rejected the view that marijuana should be lawfully
available for non-medical use (legalization), and recommended instead that the
prohibition against cultivation and distribution for non-medical purposes should
remain in force.78 However, we saw no strong reason to criminalize people who do
obtain the drug for their own use despite the efforts that society has undertaken to
keep it from them. 79 Arresting, prosecuting, and punishing people for using
marijuana is much too costly a strategy for deterring the use of the drug; instead we
should rely on instruments of social control other than criminal sanctions.80 Hence,
we used the term decriminalization.81 Recognizing the possibility that the term
could be misunderstood, we also used the phrase "partial prohibition" to describe
82our approach. It turns out, of course, that the critics of our position characterized
it as legalization in order to make it seem more radical.83 In effect, calling it
legalization aligns the cost-cutting, prudent, pragmatic approach of
decriminalization with the libertarian position.
84
As can be easily seen, a key issue in drug policy discourse is determining who
controls the vocabulary. 85 The challenge is to find exactly the right words to send
the message that one is trying to convey. For instance, a key issue for addiction
policy is embedded in the vocabulary of "disease" and the vocabulary of
rescue-a rescue of everyone who is involved in the U.S. economy, as a worker, small
investor, pensioner or saver.
Id.
76. See, e.g., Avram Goldstein & Harold Kalant, Drug Policy: Striking the Right Balance, 249 Sci.
1513, 1513 (1990) (describing the cost-benefit approach as "radical steps to repeal the prohibitions of
presently illicit drugs [that] would be likely, on balance, to make matters worse rather than better"),
77. See NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, supra note 6, at 150-51 ("[W]e have...
rejected the regulatory legalization scheme ... [but instead] we recommend only a decriminalization of
possession of marihuana for personal use on both the state and federal levels.").
78. Id. at 150-53.
79. Id. at 150.
80. Id. at 143-44.
81. Id. at 151.
82. Id. at 150.
83. See MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 8, at 114-15.
84. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 15, at 271 (describing the pragmatic approach
recommended by the Commission as including policy recommendations that remove government
controls, such as implementing selective enforcement and prosecution); McBride et al., supra note 62, at
37 ("The decriminalization perspective simply wants to eliminate laws that prohibit or regulate the
manufacture or distribution of current illegal drugs . . [T]he basic position is that of libertarianism.").
85. See, e.g., BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 15, at 97-98, 112 (discussing various efforts by
government agencies, legislatures, and public opinion makers to influence the public regarding the
"marihuana menace").
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"choice. ' 6 This Article argues that society must learn to use both words at the
same time.8 7 Neither alone gets it right.
The second implication is that a core aim of addiction policy should be to do
what the 1972 Act was designed to do--to create incentives and opportunities for
people with addictions to choose to seek addiction treatment on their own. 8
Treatments known to be effective should be available and, given the high social
cost of addiction and drug abuse, should be subsidized.89
The third implication is that, although criminal sanctions for addicted
offenders should be retained, therapeutic leverage through the criminal justice
system should be broadly encouraged and funded. 90 This approach revives a key
element of the progressive approach that was implemented during the 1970s.91 This
change is already well underway;92 however, it should be reinforced and
intensified.93
The following sections discuss each of these three claims in a bit more depth.
A. The Vocabulary of Addiction
For over a decade, the scientific leadership of the addiction field has been
waging a broad dissemination campaign to bring advances in our understanding of
the neuroscience of addiction to professional and public attention-within
medicine, among opinion-makers, and among the general public.94 This campaign
has a motto: "Addiction is a Brain Disease." 95 The core message was reflected in
86. PETER J. COHEN, DRUGS, ADDICTION, AND THE LAW: POLICY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC HEALTH
59 (2004). Evaluating the distinction between drug addiction as a disease or a choice, Cohen states that:
Society has viewed addicts as being responsible for their problems .... However, over time,
users lose control over their drug use and become addicted. To deal with their addiction
effectively requires a shift away from blaming them ... and toward treating them. The focus
must change from "who is at fault" to "what to do about the problem."
Id.
87. See infra Part III.A.
88. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-775 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2045, 2057 (stating one of
the purposes of the SAODAP was to "provide for medical treatment or assistance" for drug addicts and
to "assure that.., agencies construe drug abuse as a health problem"); infra Part III.B.
89. See infra Part III.B.
90. See infra Part II1.C.
91. See MUSTO & KORSMEYER, supra note 8, at 72 (commenting on the use of "treatment and
rehabilitation as integral parts of narcotics control policy" in 1970).
92. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
93. See infra Part III.B.
94. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 405; see also Alan I. Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It
Matters, 278 SCt. 45, 45 (1997) ("There is a wide gap between the scientific facts and public perceptions
about drug abuse and addiction. . . . [The scientific community] must bridge this informational
disconnection ... to make any real progress in controlling drug abuse and addiction.").
95. Richard J. Bonnie, Addiction and Responsibility, 68 SOC. RES. 813, 815 (2001); Leshner, supra
note 94, at 46 (explaining the importance of the understanding that addiction is a brain disease).
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the standard presentation delivered by Alan Leshner when he was Director of the
National Institute on Drug Abuse:
That addiction is tied to changes in brain structure and function is what
makes it, fundamentally, a brain disease. A metaphorical switch in the
brain seems to be thrown as a result of prolonged drug use. Initially,
drug use is a voluntary behavior, but when that switch is thrown, the
individual moves into the state of addiction, characterized by
compulsive drug seeking and use.
9 6
The characterization of addiction as a "brain disease" has been contested.97 In
my view, it is best understood as a political statement rather than a scientific
claim.98 To say that addiction is a brain disease is useful as a rhetorical tool in a
debate about public policy; but, scientifically, it is both incomplete and
premature. 99 It is incomplete because it fails to communicate the whole story about
the behavioral and contextual components of addiction. 100 Behavioral components
are much more substantial in addiction than in Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson
disease, epilepsy, or schizophrenia.10' It is premature because research has not
connected the observed changes in the brain to behavior. 10 2 After all, Dr. Leshner
found it necessary to speak metaphorically because we cannot yet speak
scientifically. 10 3 It is still not possible to explain the mechanisms and processes in
the brain that transform controlled use of drugs to addiction.'°4
Notwithstanding its scientific shortcomings, I embrace the characterization of
addiction as a brain disease as a political statement; medicalization of addiction (as
a policy choice) will have salutary effects on the lives of people enmeshed in drug
use and on society, whether or not this term captures the full complexity of the
condition. 10 5 Addiction is amenable to treatment-although outcome evaluations of
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., SALLY L. SATEL & FREDERICK K. GOODWIN, ETHICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., Is DRUG
ADDICTION A BRAIN DISEASE? 22 (1998) ("Efforts to neutralize the stigma of addiction by convincing
the public that the addict has a 'brain disease' are understandable, but in the long run they have no more
likelihood of success than the use of feel-good slogans to help a child acquire 'self-esteem."'); Stephen
J. Morse, Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility, 19 LAW & PHIL. 3, 49 (2000) ("Despite the
exciting, undoubted advances in the biological understanding of addiction and despite the plausibility of
considering addictions as diseases, the disease model does not and cannot fully explain addiction or
inform social and legal policy concerning addiction.").
98. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 406.
99. Id.
100. Id. In his standard presentation, Dr. Leshner is always careful to note that addiction is "not just
a brain disease." Leshner, supra note 94, at 46 (emphasis added).
101. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 406.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.; A. Thomas McLellan et al., Drug Dependence, A Chronic Medical Illness: Implications for
Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, 284 JAMA 1689, 1693 (2000).
105. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 406.
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treatment must take into account the high probability of relapse-and our society
should be investing more resources in treatment while reducing its expenditures on
incarceration and enforcement. 1°6 Moreover, continued investment in research is
likely to pay off in therapeutic advances, although there is likely to be no
"biological fix" for addiction.
10 7
One prominent rhetorical feature of the campaign needs much more careful
scrutiny, however-the issue of "voluntariness."'10 8 According to two leading
clinical researchers on addiction, "[a]t some point after continued repetition of
voluntary drug-taking, the drug 'user' loses the voluntary ability to control its use.
At that point, the 'drug misuser' becomes 'drug addicted' and there is a
compulsive, often overwhelming involuntary aspect to continuing drug use and to
relapse after a period of abstinence."'0 9 Dr. Leshner puts the point this way:
We need to face the fact that even if the condition initially comes about
because of a voluntary behavior (drug use), an addict's brain is different
from a nonaddict's brain, and the addicted individual must be dealt with
as if he or she is in a different brain state. We have learned to deal with
people in different brain states for schizophrenia and Alzheimer's
disease. Recall that as recently as the beginning of [the twentieth]
century we were still putting individuals with schizophrenia in
prisonlike asylums, whereas now we know they require medical
treatments. We now need to see the addict as someone whose mind
(read: brain) has been altered fundamentally by drugs. " 0
The emphasis on involuntariness bristles with implication for responsibility.'
Medicalizing addiction and emphasizing its neurobiological underpinnings is
meant to negate the common belief that addiction manifests a moral weakness or a
flaw of character, and thereby to counteract stigmatization and punishment.'
12
Presumably people should not be held morally and legally accountable for behavior
that is involuntary." 3 But we should take a much closer look at these assertions."
14
What is meant by the concept of involuntariness in this context?
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.; Charles P. O'Brien & A. Thomas McLellan, Myths About the Treatment of Addiction, 347
LANCET 237, 237 (1996).
110. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 406; Leshner, supra note 94, at 46.
111. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 406.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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1. Addiction
What is meant when it is said that drug use becomes involuntary after "the
switch is flipped"? Does the disease cause drug use in the way that a brain lesion
causes epileptic seizures or loss of cerebral blood flow causes loss of
consciousness? This is the language of mechanism, and the language of choice or
voluntariness has no place. 115 Nevertheless, something more is involved with
addiction than mechanism.11 6 Addiction is "not just a brain disease."'1 17 The link
between brain and behavior is mediated through consciousness.11 8 Thus, to
characterize an addict's drug use as "involuntary" and symptomatic of disease is
quite different from describing a seizure as involuntary; in terms of responsibility,
this is a very important distinction. 
19
Even within the realm of conscious experience, there are situations where we
properly say that a person has no real choice (like grasping the edge of a cliff,
where the inevitable effects of muscular fatigue will prevail, no matter how hard
the victim chooses to resist). 120 This, however, is the language of mechanism. But
this is not what is meant by loss of control in addiction; instead the term means that
due to neurobiological processes deep in the brain over which the addict no longer
has any control, he is experiencing a strong need for or desire for substance, and
that this need is so great that it is unlikely that he will be able to resist it. 12' This is
the language of choice and compulsion rather than mechanism and causation. 
122
The addict has a choice, just as a person experiencing "duress" ("push the
button or I'll kill you") has a choice. 123 Such situations involve a hard choice rather
than no choice. Clinically, we are addressing what most accurately might be called
115. Cf Morse, supra note 97, at 4-5 ("[H]ypertension and infections are themselves mechanisms.
The sufferer can not terminate all the signs and symptoms of the disease simply by intentionally
choosing to cease being hypertensive or infected.").
116. Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 165, 178 (2006).
117. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
118. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407.
119. Id.
120. Id.; see also Morse, supra note 97, at 5 (noting that the brain disease model of addiction
suggests that the addict has no control once prolonged use has caused the pathology).
121. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407. But see Michael Louis Corrado, Addiction and Responsibility:
An Introduction, 18 LAW & Pf-uL. 579, 581 (1999) (noting that, although it is generally stated that
addicts cannot help themselves, they are nonetheless conscious of their actions and choose to act in that
manner).
122. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; see also Morse, supra note 97, at 12-13 (describing compulsive
as the key term).
123. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; see also Morse, supra note 97, at 31-32 (applying the defense of
duress as a model for excuse based on "disorders of desire"); cf Corrado, supra note 121, at 584 (noting
that addiction as duress exists when the addict uses his drug to rationally avoid pain as opposed to
rationally pursue greater pleasure).
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"impairments of volition," rather than "involuntary behavior."1 24 This important
conceptual distinction is needed to connect scientific and clinical ideas about
addiction (and other pathological conditions involving so-called compulsions, such
as obsessive compulsive disorders) to the vocabulary of responsibility. 125
2. Relapse
The nature of relapse is another issue too easily blurred by the brain disease
rhetoric. Even after detoxification and a period of abstinence, addicts have a strong
susceptibility to relapse. In fact, forty to sixty percent of patients treated for
addiction relapse within a year, 126 and the rate is highest for tobacco addiction.1
27
Many suggest that this tendency to relapse is not voluntary because the person has
no control over conditioned responses associated with previous drug-taking. As one
group of leading addiction researchers explains:
[One neurobiological] explanation for [addicts'] tendency to relapse lies
in the integration of the reward circuitry with the motivational,
emotional and memory centers that are co-located within the limbic
system. These interconnected regions allow the organism not only to
experience the pleasure of rewards, but also to learn the signals for them
and to respond in an anticipatory manner. Repeated pairing of a person
(drug-using friend), place (coiner bar), thing (paycheck), or even an
emotional state (anger, depression) with drug use can lead to rapid and
entrenched learning or conditioning. Thus, previously drug-dependent
individuals who have been abstinent for long periods may encounter a
person, place or thing that previously was associated with their drug use,
producing significant physiologic reactions such as withdrawal-like
symptoms and profound subjective desire or craving for the drug. These
responses can combine to fuel the "loss of control" that is considered a
hallmark of drug dependence. 128
124. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; Morse, supra note 97, at 31-32.
125. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; see generally Morse, supra note 97, at 5, 23-45 (discussing
addiction and responsibility).
126. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; McLellan et al., supra note 104, at 1689.
127. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; see also Neal L. Benowitz, Nicotine Addiction, 26 PRIMARY
CARE: CLINICS IN OFFICE PRACTICE 611, 615-16 (1999) (noting that an average seventy percent of
smokers who try to quit relapse in three months and that the rate is similar to that observed for heroin
addicts and alcoholics). Cf CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CIGARETTE SMOKING AMONG ADULTS-UNITED STATES, 2007, 57 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1221, 1224-25 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/
mm5745.pdf (reporting that most smokers who attempt to quit do not use recommended cessation
methods and that, of these "untreated smokers," only four to seven percent are likely to have permanent
success in quitting); NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
TOBACCO ADDICTION 3 (2009), available at http://www.drugabuse.gov/PDF/TobaccoRRS-vl6.pdf
(indicating that more than eighty-five percent of smokers who attempt to quit on their own relapse, most
of them within the first week).
128. McLellan et al., supra note 104, at 1691.
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Does it make sense to characterize relapse as "involuntary" under these
circumstances? The physiologically conditioned feelings may be involuntarily
aroused, and relapse may be made more likely by this conditioning and the
accompanying neurobiological changes. 129 But the addict is not an automaton,
responding mindlessly to the environmental cues. 130 Instead, the addict has a strong
predisposition or vulnerability to relapse.'31 Of course, relapse is not inevitable and
its likelihood can be reduced if the addict will choose to avoid the contexts or
environments that tend to trigger relapse and will choose to seek and adhere to
treatment.1
32
Note that this discussion simultaneously uses the probabilistic vocabulary of
causation and the individual-centered language of choice. Clinically speaking, the
experience of compulsion is the experience of feeling that one must choose to do
something in order to avoid pain or dysphoria. 133 Similarly, whether a particular
individual can avoid relapse is at least partly affected by whether he or she chooses
to take precautions, such as to avoid exposure to the environmental cues.'
34
The central claim in this Article is that the concepts of disease and choice are
compatible, and that the law, which is based on our shared moral intuitions, can
easily incorporate advances in our understanding of the neural substrates of
addiction. 135 The advances amend, but do not displace, the vocabulary of choice.
B. The Case for Subsidizing Treatment
Public policy needs to create incentives and opportunities for people addicted
to drugs to choose treatment. Treatment can work, as shown by the abundant
evidence of cost-effectiveness.' 36 The legal structure that is needed for increasing
access has been in place since 1972.137 The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act
was probably the most important statute enacted during the short era of enlightened
129. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; McLellan et al., supra note 104, at 1691.
130. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; Morse, supra note 116, at 166.
131. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407.
132. Id. See generally Carlo C. DiClemente, Motivation for Change: Implications for Substance
Abuse Treatment, 10 PSYCHOL. Sci. 209, 209-12 (1999) (suggesting that recovery is more likely when
addicts are motivated to seek and adhere to treatment and where motivation is defined broadly to include
actions "shaped by contingencies, driven by unconscious motives, or directed by self-regulation").
133. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; see also Morse, supra note 116, at 188 (discussing "compulsive"
states and will "to remove... dysphoria").
134. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407.
135. Id. at 407-08.
136. E.g., Redonna K. Chandler et al., Treating Drug Abuse and Addiction in the Criminal Justice
System: Improving Public Health and Safety, 301 JAMA 183, 184-85 (2009) (explaining the success of
medication as part of drug treatment and the cost-effectiveness of treatment compared to incarceration).
137. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 7 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al. eds., 3d
ed. 1997) (describing the establishment of the SAODAP).
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and progressive drug policy. 138 Yet most people who need treatment are not
seeking it. SAMHSA has estimated that about one-in-ten people with serious
substance abuse problems (2.3 million of 21.2 million) received treatment in
2007.139 The available services are not easily accessible to those who do seek it due
to waiting lists and inconvenience, !40 and the services offered are typically too thin
and therefore not as effective as they could be. 4 1 The simple fact is that funding
has never been sufficient and addiction treatment has never been adequately
mainstreamed as a component of health care, a problem also associated with mental
health care. 1
42
In addition, parity in insurance is a huge development but will not get us
where we need to be, mainly because the vast majority of people with severe
addictive disorders-especially cocaine and opiate addictions--do not have private
insurance. 143 In any given year, about twenty-five percent of the payment for
substance abuse treatment is by private insurance. 144 If the nation ever commits
itself to universal access to health care as a right, 145 perhaps we can then be
reasonably confident that it will include addiction. 146 In the absence of universal
health insurance, however, the policy question is whether public funds should be
used to subsidize more accessible and better treatment for people who lack
138. See Jean Wellisch et al., Criminal Justice and Drug Treatment Systems Linkage: Federal
Promotion of Interagency Collaboration in the 1970s, 20 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 611, 617-18 (1993)
(discussing the development of the SAODAP); supra note 56.
139. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT FOR
SUBSTANCE USE AND DEPRESSION AMONG ADULTS, BY RACE/ETHNICITY (2009), available at
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k9/163/SusUseRaceEthinicityHTML.pdf
140. Cristina Redko et al., Waiting Time as a Barrier to Treatment Entry: Perceptions of Substance
Users, 36 J. DRUG ISSUES 831, 831 (2006).
141. CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS
PUB. No. SMA 09-4377, IMPLEMENTING CHANGE IN SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAMS 2
(2009) (suggesting substance abuse treatment programs lack adequate resources for "implementing more
effective practices").
142. See TINA MCREE et al., CALIFORNIA WORKFORCE INITIATIVE, THE MENTAL HEALTH
WORKFORCE: WHO'S MEETING CALIFORNIA'S NEEDS? 5-6 (2003) (describing the lack of funding for
mental health care in the 1990s and the inability of state and local governments to make up for the lack
of federal funding); William S. Cartwright & Paul L. Solano, The Economics of Public Health:
Financing Drug Abuse Treatment Services, 66 HEALTH POL'Y 247, 257-58 (2003) (describing
insufficient funding for substance abuse programs and noting the need for mainstreaming medical and
drug abuse treatments).
143. COHEN, supra note 86, at 331.
144. TAMI L. MARK ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL EXPENDITURES
FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT: 1993-2003, at 15 (2007).
145. See Richard J. Bonnie, Three Strands of Mental Health Law: Development Mileposts, in THE
EVOLUTION OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW 31, 51 (Lynda E. Frost & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2001) (noting
society's failure "to embrace the principle of universal access to health care").
146. See An Illness, Not a Stigma, BALT. SUN, Sept. 28, 2009 (calling upon Congress to include
substance abuse treatment in health care reform and noting that seventy-seven percent of Americans and
seventy-four percent of Marylanders support including addiction treatment in health care reform).
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insurance. 147 In short, the best argument for subsidizing drug abuse treatment today
is not that people with addiction should have the same access to treatment as people
with other health conditions-that is not good enough in the absence of universal
coverage. 14 8 Instead, treatment for addiction should be available to everyone who
needs it because treatment is known to be cost-effective and the social cost of
untreated addiction is very high.1
49
It is also important to note that the 2008 National Drug Control Strategy
150
endorses the "brain disease" characterization and touts the importance of providing
treatment as a necessary component of the comprehensive national strategy.' 15
However, the strategy focuses its discussion of providing treatment to criminal
offenders. 152 This is a step forward, to be sure, but the report does not even mention
the importance of helping people find their way into treatment voluntarily and
providing the necessary services. This was, in fact, the core insight of the 1972
Act. 153 It is in society's interest to make addiction treatment genuinely accessible to
people who want to regain control over their lives.' 54 Providing treatment when
they are in the criminal justice system is a good idea, but a criminal arrest should
not be the ticket to otherwise inaccessible addiction treatment services.
C. The Residual Role of Criminalization
Finally, what is the proper role of criminalization? Incarcerating hundreds of
thousands of drug users has been a costly mistake, as many state governments have
147. NORMAN DANIELS & MARC ROBERTS, HASTINGS CTR., FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO
CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND
CAMPAIGNS 84 (2008).
148. See COHEN, supra note 86, at 331-34 (detailing the failure of efforts to achieve mental health
parity in Congress and in the courts based upon the argument that people with addiction and mental
health problems should receive the same treatment as people with physical illnesses).
149. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH PUB. NO. 09-4180,
PRINCIPLES OF DRUG ADDICTION: A RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 12 (2d ed. 2009), available at
http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/PODAT/PODAT.pdf (concluding that drug addiction treatment is cost-
effective); OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PUB. NO.
NCJ-190636, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992-1998, at 2 (2001)
(stating that the societal cost of drug abuse was $143.4 billion by 1998); Chandler et al., supra note 136,
at 184-85 (explaining the cost-effectiveness of treating drug-involved offenders).
150. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ondcp/221371.pdf.
151. Id. at 31.
152. Id. at 29-31.
153. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-775 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2045, 2053.
154. See COHEN, supra note 86, at 309 (discussing studies that indicate the effectiveness of
treatment); WEISSMAN, supra note 19, 25-31 (discussing the substantially larger societal costs of drug
abuse relative to drug treatment and asserting that society ought to be committed to the highest
development of human potential); Chandler et al., supra note 136, at 185 (discussing the present lack of
access to treatment).
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finally recognized. 155 Providing treatment alternatives to criminal punishment was a
key component of the strategy of the 1970s1 56 that was eroded during the 1980s and
early 1990s. 157 Finally, this sound policy has been revived. 158 In fact, more than two
thousand drug courts have been established since 1995,159 and conditional
dispositions linked to drug treatment are also available in ordinary criminal
courts. 1
6 0
Returning to the conceptual and moral puzzle that lies at the heart of our
current policies toward addicted offenders, one must ask: if addiction really is a
brain disease characterized by loss of control over drug-taking, how can we justify
punishing addicted offenders for yielding to that compulsion? This question was
much debated in the 1960s and 1970s and was addressed in a somewhat
unsatisfying way by the Supreme Court in the 1960s in two pivotal decisions, in
which a closely divided Court refused to constitutionalize the defense of
"compulsion" for addicts. 161
Although the issue has not received much attention in the courts over the past
forty years, the case for excuse based on volitional impairment has only gotten
stronger, as developments in neuroscience continue to elucidate ways in which the
addicted brain is different from the non-addicted brain, and the ways in which the
genes of people who are susceptible to addiction differ from those who are not. 16 2
This body of research has led the new multi-million dollar MacArthur Foundation
155. VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., POOR PRESCRIPTION: THE COSTS OF
IMPRISONING DRUG OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 2, 19 (2000), available at
http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/PoorPrescription.pdf.
156. McBride et al., supra note 62, at 14; Joseph F. Spillane, Federal Policy in the Post-Anslinger
Era: A Guide to Sources, 1962-2001, in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND
PRACTICE 209, 214 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004); see supra notes 41-58 and
accompanying text.
157. McBride et al., supra note 62, at 15; see supra Part II.
158. See generally C. WEST HUDDELSTON, III ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PAINTING THE
CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2008), available at
http://www.ndci.org/sites/default/files/ndci/PCPIIl web%5Bl%5D.pdf (noting the importance of
treatment alternatives available via drug courts and a thirty-two percent national increase in drug courts
between 2004 and 2007).
159. Id. at I fig.i, 2.
160. NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH PUB. NO. 06-5316, PRINCIPLES
OF DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE POPULATIONS: A RESEARCH-BASED GUIDE 16
(2007), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/PODATCJ/PODAT CJ.pdf; see also WEISSMAN,
supra note 19, at 246-47 (discussing the early history of the diversion option).
161. Compare Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (recognizing that narcotic addiction
is an illness and holding that a state law that imprisons a person for being a narcotic addict is cruel and
unusual punishment), with Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 521, 536 (1968) (distinguishing Robinson and
declining to extend Robinson to establish a constitutional defense of "compulsion" for addicts).
162. See Chandler et al., supra note 136, at 186 (discussing the studies that have identified how
genes affect addiction).
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Research Program on Law and Neuroscience to use addiction as a primary case
study on the implications of scientific advances in neuroscience for doctrines of
criminal responsibility. 163 It will surely come as no surprise that many philosophers
and law professors question the moral basis for criminalization of use-related
offenses by addicted offenders. 164 And they are supported in this position by
leading addiction scientists who question the "voluntariness" of drug use by addicts
and see reduced reliance on criminal sanctions as a desirable step along the path to
a more therapeutic and less stigmatizing approach to addiction.'
65
It is still important to think about the wisdom of the position that addiction
should be a defense to possession and other drug use-related offenses. Who would
have such a defense? Who would count as an addict? And what about the
continuing grip of addiction after detoxification? Would addicts who were clean
but relapsed have a defense? Moreover, presumably the same argument that erases
responsibility also establishes the basis for involuntary commitment. Would it
make sense to displace the current regime of criminal sanctions as applied to
addicts with a regime of civil commitment and coerced treatment? And what sort of
treatment can be compelled? Would we want to coerce people to take the anti-
craving pharmacotherapies that are being developed?
We should not be trying to erase responsibility for addiction. As any sensible
addiction therapist will say, the goal of treatment is to get the patient to accept
responsibility for avoiding relapse and for getting help when temptations arise.'
66
What is not often recognized, however, is that characterization of addiction as a
chronic relapsing disorder like diabetes or asthma, or even bipolar disorder,
highlights the issue of personal responsibility that is at the heart of chronic disease
management.167 As previously noted, a key objective of addiction policy should be
163. The Law & Neuroscience Project, http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.org/ (last visited Feb.
18, 2010).
164. See, e.g., Douglas N. Husak, Addiction and Criminal Liability, 18 LAW & PHIL. 655, 659-64
(1999) (arguing in favor of drug addiction as a defense to criminal liability). For a review of recent
literature on this subject, see Gideon Yaffe, Recent Work on Addiction and Responsible Agency, 30
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 178, 178-79 (2001).
165. See Steven E. Hyman, The Neurobiology of Addiction: Implications for Voluntary Control of
Behavior, 7 AM. J. BIOETHICs 8, 8-10 (2007) (noting that results of cognitive and neuroscience studies
of addicts have called into question the "folk psychology view" that all behavior is voluntarily
controlled); Thomas R. Kosten, Editorial, Addiction as a Brain Disease, 155 AM J. PSYCHIATRY 711,
711 (1998) (commenting that scientific developments in the understanding of addictive disorders have
aided in moving the view of addiction from that of a "moral failure" to a "brain disease," but that greater
investment in criminal justice over treatment indicates this shift is not complete); Leshner, supra note
94, at 46 (arguing that "[a]n accurate understanding of the nature of drug abuse... should.., affect our
criminal justice strategies," and that if we understand addiction as a "brain disease," then "imprisoning
[addicts] without treatment is futile").
166. Seymour M. Halleck, Which Patients Are Responsible for Their Illnesses?, 42 AM. J.
PSYCHOTHERAPY 338, 338, 348 (1988).
167. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT
APPROACHES FOR DRUG ADDICTION 1 (2008), available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/lnfoFacts/
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to provide the incentives and opportunities for addicted people (and people
vulnerable to addiction) to choose to help themselves.' 68
What then is the role of criminal sanctions under a pragmatic drug policy?
The virtue of criminalization is that it provides an instrument for exercising
therapeutic leverage. The threat of getting caught up in the criminal justice system
might also serve a useful deterrent function by prodding people who are losing
control to seek help on their own, but one should not rest the case for
criminalization on deterrence alone. Instead, the argument should emphasize the
leverage function because it is one of the reasons that the use of the criminal justice
system is preferable to civil commitment-the only available legal alternative for
getting addicts into treatment. 169 The distinction here is between coerced treatment
and leveraged treatment. Arresting addicted offenders and giving them a choice-
treatment in lieu of the usual disposition-is preferable to ordering them to undergo
treatment or, if long-acting pharmacotherapies are developed, forcibly
administering it to them. 70
CONCLUSION
In sum, although it may first appear as a regressive view, we cannot de-
stigmatize either drug use or addiction altogether. Criminalization of consumption-
related offenses is legitimate-both as an instrument of deterrence and prevention
for non-addicted offenders and, most importantly, as an instrument of therapeutic
leverage for addicted offenders. 171 The ultimate aim of addiction policy is to create
incentives and opportunities for people with addictive disorders (or people who are
fearful of their vulnerability to addiction) to choose to get help on their own. 172
Therefore, the primary strategy should not be criminalization; 173 instead, the
strategy should focus on increasing access to treatment that works and taking steps
to draw people into the treatment system voluntarily-or, more accurately, in
TreatmentO8.pdf ("For many people, drug abuse becomes chronic, with relapses ... occur[ring] at rates
similar to those for other well-characterized, chronic medical illnesses .... Like people with diabetes or
heart disease, [drug addicts] will also need to change their behavior to adopt a more healthful
lifestyle.").
168. See supra Part III.B.
169. See WEISSMAN, supra note 19, at 252-53 (describing civil commitment schemes and
enumerating criticisms of civil commitment, including procedures for certification and release of the
addict, length of the civil commitment process, availability and quality of treatment, and effectiveness).
170. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 410.
171. See Chandler et al., supra note 136, at 184 ("Through monitoring, supervision, and threat of
legal sanctions, the justice system can provide leverage to encourage drug abusers to enter and remain in
treatment.").
172. See supra Part III.B.
173. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 149, at 35 (discussing the importance of a multi-
faceted approach to treating drug addiction that includes counseling, medication, and other forms of
voluntary treatment); Chandler et al., supra 136, at 183-84 (citing statistics on the inadequacy of
incarceration without treatment in addressing drug abuse and addiction).
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response to the therapeutic leverage that is exercised by family members and
employers. 174 Moreover, when effective pharmacotherapies emerge, we ought to
subsidize their use. 17 5 Over time, we ought to be able to reduce our reliance on the
criminal justice system substantially.
For now, though, the continued use of leveraged treatment through the
criminal justice system is the most sensible policy because it would help us achieve
the goals of drug policy more effectively overall than any alternative approach.
176
The virtue of pragmatism in drug policy is that it focuses our attention on what
works best.177 Development of effective medications is an essential part of that
strategy.' 78 A key aim of drug policy in the coming years is to increase use of
effective pharmacotherapies for offenders in the criminal justice system.' 79 There is
every reason to believe that the science will move forward.180 We also need to
design drug policy to take maximum advantage of therapeutic advances when they
occur, which means making novel treatments available when they are shown to be
cost-effective and subsidizing their use when people are uninsured or underinsured.
174. See Douglas B. Marlowe et al., Assessment of Coercive and Noncoercive Pressures to Enter
Drug Abuse Treatment, 42 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 77, 81-82 (1996) ("[D]ata suggest that it
may be nonproductive to rely excessively on legal mandates to enforce drug treatment compliance.
More promising results might be obtained by leveraging or capitalizing on informal pressures stemming
from [addicts'] natural social networks .... ").
175. See CTR. FOR COGNITIVE LIBERTY & ETHICS, THREATS TO COGNITIVE LIBERTY:
PHARMACOTHERAPY AND THE FUTURE OF THE DRUG WAR 40 (2004), available at
http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/Pharmacotherapy2004.pdf (recommending the partial
reallocation of funds from arresting illegal drug users to reimburse people who voluntarily undergo
pharmacotheraphy treatment); EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2009), available al http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/ndcs09/2009ndcs.pdf (noting the importance of developing pharmacotherapies as a
part of the federal strategy to treat addiction).
176. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 160, at 3 ("The coordination of drug abuse
treatment with correctional planning can encourage participation in drug abuse treatment and can help
treatment providers incorporate correctional requirements as treatment goals."); Chandler et al., supra
note 136, at 183-84 (commenting on the inadequacy of incarceration alone to treat drug addicts and the
effectiveness of combining treatment through the criminal justice system).
177. See Don C. Des Jarlais, Editorial, Harm Reduction: A Framework for Incorporating Science
into Drug Policy, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 10 (1995) (characterizing pragmatism in drug policies as a
basic component of a harm reduction strategy).
178. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 175, at 22.
179. See id. ("An ongoing research effort ... has evaluated over 200 compounds as potential drug
addiction treatments.").
180. See id. ("[R]esearch continues to make key discoveries about the safety and efficacy of
medications ... to improve the treatment of... addiction.").
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